Coevolutionary games on graphs  Page description

Help  Print 
Back »
 

Details of project

  
Identifier
101490
Type K
Principal investigator Szabó, György
Title in Hungarian Koevolúciós játékok gráfokon
Title in English Coevolutionary games on graphs
Keywords in Hungarian evolúciós játékelmélet
Keywords in English evolutionary games
Discipline
Physics (Council of Physical Sciences)100 %
Ortelius classification: Statistical physics
Panel Physics 1
Department or equivalent Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science (Centre for Energy Research)
Participants Szolnoki, Attila
Starting date 2012-04-01
Closing date 2016-03-31
Funding (in million HUF) 5.502
FTE (full time equivalent) 6.40
state closed project
Summary in Hungarian
A statisztikus fizika fogalmainak és módszereinek alkalmazásával olyan sokszereplős koevolúciós játékokat kívánunk tanulmányozni, amelyek általános matematikai keretet biztosítanak a biológiai, közgazdaságtani vagy társadalmi jelenségek vizsgálatához. Modelljeinkben a játékosok egy gráf pontjain helyezkednek el és megengedjük, hogy szereplők változtassák stratégiájukat, kapcsolataikat vagy akár a személyes tulajdonságaikat is. Egyik célunk azon általános tulajdonságok felderítése, amelyek segítik a közösség számára előnyös viselkedés kialakulását. Emellett kívánjuk tanulmányozni a stratégiatársulások között kialakuló önszervező mintázatképződés jellegzetességeit, illetve a részletes egyensúlytól való eltérés mértékét és szerepét a kialakuló állandósult állapotban különböző modelleknél.
Summary
Using the concepts and tools of statistical physics we wish to study co-evolutionary games providing a general mathematical background for the investigations of biological, economical, and social problems. In these models the players are located on the sites of a graph and allowed to modify their strategies, connectivity structures, personal features, etc. One of our main goal is to explore those general features supporting the maintenance of cooperative behavior in the society of selfish individuals. Besides it, we wish to study the self-organizing patterns due to the competition between the associations of different strategies. Additionally, we intend to investigate quantitatively the measure and role of the deviation from the detailed balance in the stationary state for different models.




 

Final report

  
Results in Hungarian
Evolúciós játékelméleti modellek segítségével vizsgáltuk azokat a körülményeket, amelyek segítik a társadalom számára előnyös magatartásformák elterjedését olyan társadalmi dilemma helyzetekben, amikor az egyéni érdek ezzel ellentétes. Tanulmányoztuk például a büntetés kölönböző változatainak hatását, a valósághoz közelibb kapcsolatrendszerek következményeit, és az utánzás pontosságának vonzatait az evolúciós ultimátum játékban. A játékelmélet nyereménymátrix fogalmával leírható kölcsönhatások egy részhalmaza azonos azzal, amelyeket a fizikában használunk arra, hogy az atomokból álló anyag termodinamikai viselkedését meghatározzuk. A nyereménymátrix összetevőkre bontásával sikerült igazolni, hogy ezen kölcsönhatások mellett léteznek olyan összetevők is, amelyek a társadalmi dilemmákat illetve a biodiverzitás fennmaradását okozzák.
Results in English
Using evolutionary games we have studied the conditions supporting the maintenance of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas when the individual interest dictates the opposite choice. For example, we have investigated the effects of different versions of punishments, the consequences of a wide scale of realistic connectivity structures, and the emergence of fair behavior in the evolutionary ultimatum game when the accuracy of imitation is improved. A large subset of games can be used to describe the pair interactions among the atoms when evaluating thermodynamic behavior. The decomposition of matrix games into the sum of elementary games has clearly indicated the presence of additional components that causes dilemmas in social systems or supports the persistence of biodiversity in biological systems.
Full text https://www.otka-palyazat.hu/download.php?type=zarobeszamolo&projektid=101490
Decision
Yes





 

List of publications

  
Szolnoki A, Chen X: Benefits of tolerance in public goods games, PHYS REV E, 92, 042813, 2015
Chen X, Szolnoki A, Perc M: Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game games, PHYS REV E STAT NONLIN 92, 012819, 2015
Szolnoki A, Perc M: Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation, Proc. R. Soc. B, 282, 20151975, 2015
Nax HH, Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Helbing D: Stability of cooperationunder image scoring in group interactions, Sci. Rep. 5, 12145, 2015
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies, EPL, 110, 38003, 2015
Wang Z, Wang L, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium, Eur. Phys. J. B, 88, 124, 2015
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas, J. R. Soc. Interface 12, 20141299, 2015
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Collective influence in evolutionary social dilemmas, EPL, 113, 58004, 2016
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas, Sci. Rep. 6, 23633, 2016
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Coevolutionary success-driven multigames, Europhys. Lett. 108, 28004, 2014
Szolnoki A, Mobilia M, Jiang L-L, Szczesny B, Rucklidge AM, and Perc M: Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review, J. R. Soc. Interface 11, 20140735, 2014
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas, J. R. Soc. Interface 12, 20141299, 2014
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma, New J. Phys. 16, 113003, 2015
Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Mobilia M: Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity, Phys. Rev. E 89, 042802, 2014
Szolnoki A, Vukov J, and Perc M: From pairwise to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance, Phys. Rev. E 89, 062125, 2014
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations, Sci. Rep. 4, 5496, 2014
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution, New J. Phys. 16, 033041, 2014
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations, Sci. Rep. 4, 5496, 2014
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations, Phys. Rev. E 90, 032813, 2014
Varga L, Vukov J, and Szabó G: Self-organizing patterns in an evolutionary rock-paper-scissors game for stochastic synchronized strategy update, Phys. Rev. E 90, 042920, 2014
Szabó G, Varga L, and Borsos I: Evolutionary matching-pennies game on bipartite regular networks, Phys. Rev. E 89, 042820, 2014
Szabó G, Bodó KS, Allen B, and Nowak MA: Fourier decomposition of payoff matrix for symmetric three-strategy games, Phys. Rev. E 90, 042811, 2014
Szabó G and Szolnoki A: Congestion phenomena caused by matching pennies in evolutionary games, Phys. Rev. E 91, 032110, 2015
Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Vortices detemine the dynamics of biodiversity in cyclical interactions with protection spillovers, New J. Phys. 17, 113033, 2015
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations, Sci. Rep. 4, 5496, 2014
Perc M and Szolnoki A: Double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games, Sci. Rep. 5, 11027, 2015
Jeromos Vukov, Levente Varga, Benjamin Allen, Martin A Nowak, György Szabó: Payoff components and their effects in a spatial three-strategy evolutionary social dilemma, PHYS REV E STAT NONLIN 92, 012813, 2015
Szabó G, Bodó KS, Allen B, Nowak MA: Four classes of interactions for evolutionary games, PHYS REV E STAT NONLIN 92: (2), 2015
Chen X-J, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma, Phys. Rev. E 86, 036101, 2012
Chen X-J, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas, EPL, 2012
Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Szabó G: Accuracy in strategy imitations promotes the evolution of fairness in the spatial ultimatum game, EPL, 2012
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewardind, New J. Phys., 2012
Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Szabó G: Defense mechanisms of empathetic players in the spatial ultimatumm game, Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012
Perc M, Gómez-Gardenes J, Szolnoki A, Floria LM, and Moreno Y: Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review, J. R. Soc. Interface, 2013
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games, Scientific Reports, 2012
Szolnoki A, Wang Z, and Perc M: Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary dilemmas, Scientific Reports, 2012
Szabó G, Szolnoki A, and Czakó L: Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas, J. Theor. Biol., 2013
Szolnoi A and Perc M: Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution od public cooperation, J. Theor. Biol., 2013
Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Szabó G: Accuracy in strategy imitations promotes the evolution of fairness in the spatial ultimatum game, EPL 100, 28005, 2012
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding, New J. Phys. 4, 078701, 2012
Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Szabó G: Defense mechanisms of empathetic players in the spatial ultimatumm game, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 078701, 2012
Perc M, Gómez-Gardenes J, Szolnoki A, Floria LM, and Moreno Y: Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review, J. R. Soc. Interface 10, 20120997, 2013
Szolnoki A, Wang Z, and Perc M: Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary dilemmas, Scientific Reports 2, 576, 2012
Szabó G, Szolnoki A, and Czakó L: Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas, J. Theor. Biol. 317, 126, 2013
Jiang L-L, Perc M, and Szolnoki A: If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insight from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game, PLoS ONE 8 (5) 64677, 2013
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: Phase transitions to elementary strategies, PHYS. Rev. X 3, 041021, 2013
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Decelerated invasion and waining-moon patterns in public goods games with delayed distribution, Phys. Rev. E 87, 054801, 2013
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation, J. Theor. Biol. 325, 34-41, 2013
Szolnoki A, Xie N-G, Ye Y, and Perc M: Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas, Phys. Rev E 87, 042805, 2013
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Information sharing promotes prosocial behavior, New J. Phys. 15 (5) 053010, 2013
Szolnoki A: Komplex viselkedés társadalmi dilemmákban, Természet Világa 144 (II) 98, 2013
Vukov J, Szolnoki A, and Szabó G: Diverging fluctuations in spatial five-species cyclic dominance game, Phys. Rev. E 88, 022123, 2013
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games, Sci. Rep. 3, 1183, 2013
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation, Sci. Rep. 3, 2470, 2013
Szolnoki A, Antonioni A, Tomassini M, and Perc M: Binary birth-death dynamics and expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth, Europhys. Lett. 105, 48001, 2014
Szolnoki A and Perc M: Evolution of extortion in structured populations, Phys. Rev. E 89, 022804, 2014
Wang Z, Szolnoki A, and Perc M: Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation, J. Theor. Biol. 349, 50, 2014
Szabó G and Borsos I: Evolutionary potential games on lattices, PHYS REP 624, 1-60, 2016



Back »